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The technological fix as social cure-all: origins and implications 
 
Introduction 
In 1966, a well-connected engineer posed a provocative question: will technology solve all our social problems? He 
seemed to imply that it would, and soon. Even more contentiously, he hinted that engineers could eventually 
supplant social scientists – and perhaps even policy-makers, lawmakers and religious leaders – as the best trouble-
shooters and problem-solvers for society [1]. 
The engineer was the Director of Tennessee’s Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Dr Alvin Weinberg. As an active 
networker, essayist and contributor to government committees on science and technology, he reached wide 
audiences over the following four decades. 
Weinberg did not invent the idea, but he gave it a memorable name: the “technological fix”. This article unwraps his 
package, identifies the origins of its claims and assumptions, and explores the implications for present-day 
technologists and society. I will argue that, despite its radical tone, Weinberg’s message echoed and clarified the 
views of predecessors and contemporaries, and the expectations of growing audiences. His proselytizing embedded 
the idea in modern culture as an enduring and seldom-questioned article of faith: technological innovation could 
confidently resolve any social issue. 
Weinberg’s rhetorical question was a call-to-arms for engineers, technologists and designers, particularly those who 
saw themselves as having a responsibility to improve society and human welfare. It was also aimed at institutions, 
offering goals and methods for government think-tanks and motivating corporate mission-statements [2]. 
The notion of the technological fix also proved to be a good fit to consumer culture. Our attraction to technological 
solutions to improve daily life is a key feature of contemporary lifestyles. This allure carries with it a constellation 
of other beliefs and values, such as confidence in reliable innovation and progress, trust in the impact and 
effectiveness of new technologies, and reliance on technical experts as general problem-solvers. 
This faith can nevertheless be myopic. It may, for example, discourage adequate assessment of side-effects – both 
technical and social – and close examination of political and ethical implications of engineering solutions. Societal 
confidence in technological problem-solving consequently deserves critical and balanced attention. 
Faith in Fixes 
Adoption of technological approaches to solve social, political and cultural problems has been a long-standing 
human strategy, but is a particular feature of modern culture. The context of rapid innovation has generated 
widespread appreciation of the potential of technologies to improve modern life and society. The resonances in 
modern culture can be discerned in the ways that popular media depicted the future, and in how contemporary 
problems have increasingly been framed and addressed in narrow technological terms. 
While the notion of the technological fix is straightforward to explain, tracing its circulation in culture is more 
difficult. One way to track the currency of a concept is via phrase-usage statistics. The invention and popularity of 
new terms can reveal new topics and discourse. The Google N-Gram Viewer is a useful tool that analyzes a large 
range of published texts to determine frequency of usage over time for several languages and dialects [3].  
In American English, the phrase technological fix emerges during the 1960s and proves more enduring and popular 
than the less precise term technical fix (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. Modern problem-solving rhetoric: Usage of the terms (A) "technological solution", (B) 
"technological fix", and (C) "technical fix", according to Google n-gram analysis. 
We can track this across languages. In German, the term technological fix has had limited usage as an untranslated 
English import, and is much less common than the generic phrase technische Lösung (“technical solution”), which 
gained ground from the 1840s. In French, too, there is no direct equivalent, but the phrase solution technique 
broadly parallels German and English usage over a similar time period. And in British English, the terms 
technological fix and technical fix appear at about the same time as American usage, but grow more slowly in 
popularity. Usage thus hints that there are distinct cultural contexts and meanings for these seemingly similar terms. 
Its varying currency suggests that the term technological fix became a cultural export popularized by Alvin 
Weinberg’s writings on the topic, but related to earlier discourse about technology-inspired solutions to human 
problems. 
Such data suggest rising precision in writing about technology as a generic solution-provider, particularly after the 
Second World War. But while the modern popularization and consolidation of the more specific notion of the 
“technological fix” can be traced substantially to the writings of Alvin Weinberg, the idea was promoted earlier in 
more radical form.  
The voices of technocracy 
Journalists after the First World War christened modern culture ‘the Machine Age’, a period that vaunted the 
mechanization of cities and agriculture, industrial efficiency, “scientific management” and, most of all, engineering 
solutions to modern problems [4]. Social progress became associated with applied science. Electric appliances, for 
example, extended productivity and leisure pursuits; radio entertained, educated, and united the nation; motor 
vehicles and aircraft provided a new mobility for at least a privileged few.  
But praise of technological change was accompanied by criticisms of the imperfections of modern society, often by 
the same analysts. The longest-lived voices were members of a group initially called the Technical Alliance, and 
later Technocracy Inc. Although having no verifiable engineering training, Howard Scott became the Chief Engineer 
and persuasive spokesperson for the Alliance, which included General Electric engineer Charles Steinmetz, social 
philosopher Thorstein Veblen, and economist Stuart Chase. The group railed against the problems of waste, 
inefficiency and incompetence of industrialists and government leaders, and called for the application of “the 
achievements of science to societal and industrial affairs” [5]. They sought to collect reliable facts and to apply 
rational engineering principles to modern problems of all kinds. 
The group is noteworthy in the way it boiled down popular ideas circulating among engineers for wider publics. 
Scott first reached audiences through a newspaper interview. He described how streetcar design had been improved 
to safeguard passengers, who often suffered injuries by falling from crowded running boards. Instead of relying on 
ineffective laws, policing and public education, Scott said, ‘The engineers solved it easily. They built cars that didn’t 
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have platforms” [6].  
The tale communicated Scott’s common-sense conviction that social measures could be rendered unnecessary by 
wise engineering. Streetcars with retracting steps and closing doors ensured that passengers could not harm 
themselves. The anecdote was so effective in describing the essence of technological fixes that it became a feature of 
Scott’s speeches for the successor organization, Technocracy Inc and was reproduced as a graphic (Figure 2) on 
postcards and placards over the following eight decades [7]. His second-in-command, oil geologist Marion King 
Hubbert, featured similar examples in their Technocracy Study Course, which the organization updated into the 
twenty-first century [8].  
 
Figure 2. Graphic displayed at Technocracy Inc meeting halls and public exhibits from the 1930s [source: 
Technocracy Inc, courtesy of George Wright]. 
Postwar recovery and optimism 
Though the technocrats were most prominent during the 1930s, they also found fresh audiences after the Second 
World War. Rallies and long-distance road cavalcades across North America carried their message about the power 
of technologies to transform society. Engineers and scientists comprised a significant fraction of their membership 
and audiences, including those who had worked on the Manhattan Project during the war and were now imagining 
applications of nuclear energy. Their inspiration was to apply rapid innovation to recalcitrant human problems that 
had outlasted the war (Figure 3). 
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Figure 3: Engineers and scientists as social problem-solvers [source: New York Herald Tribune, 7 Aug 1945 
(the day after Hiroshima), p.22] 
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Among them was Richard L. Meier (1920-2007, Figure 4), a wartime research chemist who turned to investigating 
technological solutions for postwar urban problems. He was a technological optimist who conceived socio-
technological systems to reduce inequity and yield wider societal benefits.  
At least one contemporary reviewer identified “naïve rationalism” and “the spirit of technocratic speculation” in 
Meier’s enthusiasms [9]. His work over subsequent decades was, however, the antithesis of the technocrats’ casual 
claims as it carefully explored the political, economic, social and cultural dimensions of complex technological 
systems affecting urban and regional development [10].  
 
Figure 4. Richard L. Meier c1965 [source: University of California, courtesy of Meier family] 
Other contemporary scientists supported similar views, some of whom – like Meier and Weinberg – joined the 
Federation of Atomic Scientists, a new organization seeking to guide beneficial applications of nuclear energy [11]. 
A sounding-board for Weinberg’s ideas was Harvey Brooks, Dean of Engineering and Applied Physics at Harvard. 
Brooks, too, had participated in nuclear reactor design and had an interest in applying scientific expertise for societal 
benefit [12]. In an era of growing technological confidence, these hopeful analysts and their peers offered a rational 
route for societal improvement.  
Weinberg’s formulation: National Labs for societal problems 
Alvin Weinberg’s optimism identified rational analysis and technological innovation as the key drivers of societal 
progress. He argued that it was “the brilliant advances in the technology of energy, of mass production, and of 
automation”, not social systems or ideologies, that “created the affluent society” [13].  
Weinberg (1915-2006, Figures 5 and 6) focused his postwar career on the design, applications and wider 
implications of nuclear reactors, becoming Director of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) in 1955. His 
high-profile position allowed Weinberg to represent not just the nascent field of nuclear engineering, but also the 
closer integration of technological innovation with the goals of modern American society [14]. His networking 
provided him with experience as a senior administrator in the new environment of publicly funded engineering in 
the national interest, and insights about the new scale and societal implications of “big science”, a term he 
popularized [15]. 
As Weinberg later recalled, 
I began to look upon nuclear energy as a symbol of a new technologically oriented civilization – 
the ultimate “technological fix” that would forever eliminate quarrels over scarce raw materials. I 
coined the phrase “technological fix” to connote technical inventions that could help resolve 
predominantly social problems…. 
So closely was he identified with the concept that Weinberg later characterized his career as that of a “technological 
fixer” [16]. 
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Figure 5: Alvin Weinberg teaching at the Oak Ridge Institute for Nuclear Studies, 1946. Courtesy of ORNL. 
Weinberg’s cogent articles did not present the polemics of an interwar technocrat. He was cautious not to reveal his 
own political views, and avoided blaming politicians and economists for societal imperfections. Instead, Weinberg 
packaged the concept of the technological fix in a form that invited responses from policy-makers.  
Weinberg’s examples of technological fixes ranged from common-sense solutions to provocative examples that 
seemed to lie on an ethically slippery slope. His easy-to-accept cases included consumer campaigner Ralph Nader’s 
contention that engineering safer cars might provide quicker reduction of traffic deaths than trying to change driving 
behaviors. Similarly, he argued that cigarette filters were obviously better than legislation or health education 
campaigns to convince smokers to give up cigarettes. But Weinberg also offered more uncomfortable illustrations, 
for example the notion of providing free air conditioners to literally cool down urban tensions in American cities of 
the late 1960s, or the benefits of intra-uterine devices (IUDs) to limit family size and economic deprivation [17]. 
As a member of government policy panels during the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations, Weinberg 
gained the ears of legislators. Besides the air-conditioning of slums, he lobbied for a wall between North and South 
Vietnam to limit enemy incursions and thus scale down the war, although he quickly labelled it an “amateurish 
notion” after feedback from his peers [18]. Weinberg disclaimed other ideas – notably the general provision of soma 
pills to relieve unhappiness, as portrayed in Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World, to suggest there were limits to how 
far technological fixes should go. He adapted to his audiences, being circumspect about the feasibility of 
technological fixes when writing for experts in the social sciences but optimistic when preaching to classes of 
engineering graduates.  
For legislators and the 1968 Presidential candidates, Weinberg proposed a national strategy founded on 
technological fixes. He argued that the expertise in physical science and engineering marshalled at National Labs 
since the war could be reoriented to solve predominantly social problems. The “neat trick”, he confided to Harvey 
Brooks, was that “social problems could be converted into technological problems” [19]. With national oversight, he 
suggested, technological analysis and problem-solving could trump traditional social, political, economic, 
educational, and moral approaches. 
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Figure 6. Alvin Weinberg in Washington, late 1960s. Courtesy of ORNL and the Howard H. Baker Jr Center 
for Public Policy, University of Tennessee. 
Popular Confidence in Technological Fixes 
Influenced by campaigners such as Scott, Meier and Weinberg, popular support for technological solutions was 
particularly strong in the decades after the war.  
For Weinberg the Manhattan Project represented the paradigm technological fix, in which a powerful technology 
neutralized enemy aggression and bypassed diplomatic negotiation and political alliances. Similarly, he credited the 
H-bomb as a technological solution to the problem of war that did not require changing human nature. 
For Meier and Weinberg, postwar planning had provided evidence that rationalized housing, transport and 
communication networks could quickly improve the quality of life in cities under any political system. Nascent 
nuclear energy projects also channeled the promise of new technology to transform societies. During the Atoms for 
Peace initiative of the mid-1950s, for example, atomic energy was forecast as a means of irradiating food to avoid 
spoilage, desalinating seawater to irrigate deserts and increase food production, and supplying low-cost electrical 
power to boost economies [20].  
Over the following decade, the successes of major technological projects provided confidence in engineering 
ingenuity to achieve ambitious goals. The space race addressed seemingly insoluble technical challenges and, as 
trumpeted by NASA, its contractors and media sources, spun off associated technologies for consumer benefit [21]. 
Urban planners supported regeneration projects in which reconfigured infrastructure would transform social life, 
such as implementing expressway networks in lock-step with urban renewal. Supporting these enthusiastic forecasts 
was a widespread but seldom interrogated popular faith in the link between technological and social progress, as 
well as underlying belief in technological determinism and the inevitability of social adaptation to innovation. 
Even more widely accepted examples of technological fixes were to be found in technologies applied to health and 
wellbeing. In a period of unprecedented access to inexpensive food, scientific nutrition was popularized by via over-
the-counter vitamin supplements and diet aids [22]. Such fixes, argued supporters, could correct for unbalanced 
dietary regimes, hectic lifestyles, inexpert cooking, lack of will-power or low income [23]. Perhaps the most 
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dramatic of technological fixes for lifestyle and diet-induced illness was the heart transplant, first trialed to public 
acclaim during the late 1960s, and hopes for artificial hearts [24]. 
More recently, software technologies have been embraced by consumers as even more seductive ways to 
supplement personal skills, improve efficiency, and empower lifestyles – a marketing philosophy dubbed 
“solutionism”. By sidestepping traditional forms of education, self-motivation, skills-development or political 
action, such software solutions are technological fixes in precisely the form defined by Weinberg [25]. 
Institutional Confidence in Fixes 
Technological fixes also remain popular for organizations and government as solutions to novel and acute problems 
today. A couple of broad issues can suggest prevalent attitudes. 
A first domain is resolution of environmental problems. As environmental concerns rose from the late 1960s, with 
growing attention to air and river pollution, oil-tanker spills, and fears about nuclear waste, technological quick fixes 
were proposed as timely and reassuring solutions. Current options include oil-digesting microbes to deal with spills 
and industrial waste, biodegradable packaging, biotechnologies for fuel production and schemes for addressing 
anthropogenic climate change via geo-engineering [26].  
A second domain of problems attracting technology-dominated responses is terrorism. As airplane hijackings 
proliferated during the early 1970s, and more varied threats were identified after 2000, technologists responded with 
imaginative solutions ranging from low-tech lockable cockpit doors, to technologies monitoring internet 
communications, to materials-detecting and body-scanning systems. In the tradition of technological fixes, these 
hardware solutions are rapid responses to events that have relatively complex social, political or economic roots 
[27]. 
Quandaries and Implications of Technological Fixes 
Such examples suggest support for the notion of technological fixes by large companies, governments and the 
general population, as much as by engineers themselves [28]. But alongside unreflective acceptance of clever 
technological solutions for urgent problems, there is evidence of growing societal concerns about some aspects of 
technological fixes. Such concerns deserve to refocus the discussion begun by Weinberg fifty years ago.  
Critical assessments of technological fixes have variously identified reliance on technological solutions as evidence 
for inadequate engineering practice, failures of government policy, or outcomes of modern consumerism. These 
concerns suggest that technological fixes have important implications for shared social values, the wellbeing of 
wider publics, and the social role of engineers. In short, technological fixes have cultural, ethical and political 
dimensions. 
Cultural losses of faith in technology 
Like expressions of technological faith, critiques of technology have grown around particular examples. As early as 
the 1960s, opponents of the Vietnam War cited the impotence of high-technology military systems against the 
guerilla methods of a resourceful enemy [29]. If high technology can be negated by such social and political 
opposition, this seemed to suggest, why should technological fixes be trusted as a panacea for social and political 
problems? 
For urban audiences over the same period, nuclear technologies were increasingly cited as inherently dangerous. For 
growing numbers, the field represented a failure of government-managed safety certification procedures and a 
secretive industry. Similarly the chemical industry, which had once been praised for technological fixes such as 
DDT to kill agricultural pests and assure high crop yields, was now criticized as the source of widespread ecological 
damage [30]. Such technological criticism in America was pointed to catastrophes such as super-tanker spills [31] as 
representative of decision-making that prioritized the global petrochemical economy. And while human health 
remained the domain of technological fixes evincing the most widespread optimism, some topics raised growing 
disquiet among consumers. Among them was an entirely new field for technological fixes: genetic engineering to 
design foods that could be longer-lasting or more nutritious (but not necessarily tastier), or to cure inherited illnesses 
or extend human choices (but also introducing myriad moral questions alongside these new powers). Such cases 
were cited to argue that technological solutions streamlined analysis, prioritized economic, corporate or consumer 
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interests rather than wider benefits, and under-estimated societal side-effects. 
Ethical implications 
Early scholarly criticisms of Alvin Weinberg’s notions criticized them as naively confident about the outcomes of 
science (“scientistic”) and tending to narrowly define the complexity of problems (“reductionistic”) [32]. Because of 
its exaggerated attention to measurable outcomes, rational decision-making carries additional philosophical and 
ethical dimensions. This confidence in positivism prioritizes confidence in quantitative evidence, and necessarily 
devotes less consideration to aspects of human values that cannot be counted.  
The focus on outcomes also identifies the link between technological fixes and utilitarian ethics, in which the goal is 
to maximize positive consequences (“the greatest good”). This ethical framework works well for purely engineering 
problems, but can disfavor groups or environments that are not identified as the intended beneficiaries (“the greatest 
number”). There are other ethical alternatives for judging responsible innovation: notably duty-based ethics 
(deontology) and virtue ethics, which instead focus on rights and on personal behaviors, respectively.  
The narrowing of analytical dimensions (reductionism) is particularly dangerous when problem-solving relies on 
technological fixes: how can we adequately assess whether a solution satisfies the unvoiced or inexpressible wishes 
of all those affected? The problem becomes acute when we consider communities, species and environments 
without a voice. 
Philosopher Arne Naess criticized such ethical implications of relying on technological solutions. He argued that 
popular enthusiasm for such fixes tended to prioritize the status quo, i.e. the interests of current ways of life, and 
particularly current socio-economic conditions and interests. Naess argued that technological fixes carried cultural 
presuppositions about what was “reasonable”, and consequently framed problems narrowly. They generally 
underestimate the scale and nature of socio-technical problems and the potency and side-effects that engineering 
solutions can offer. Naess called short-term environmental attentions and technologically-oriented solutions shallow 
ecology, and offered his own deep ecology approach in its place. Naess’s alternative analysis sought to consider 
social, cultural and technological solutions in tandem, and identified technological fixes as simplistic and inadequate 
[33]. 
Along the same lines, economist Ernst Schumacher defined appropriate technology as morally responsible 
innovation that takes equal account of local social needs, resources, labor, and skills in ways that most technological 
fixes do not. He argued that popular engineering criteria such as efficiency, elegance, and versatility could work 
against creating a genuinely sustainable sociotechnical system. Schumacher sometimes referred to his approach as 
“Buddhist economics”, in the sense of incorporating moral and social values into modern systematic problem-
solving in much the way that some eastern theologies did [34]. 
For an even wider range of theorists, the technological fix was portrayed as hubris, or excessive confidence, 
regarding human abilities to adequately understand and manage society and nature through rational means. As a 
“band-aid” solution to problems involving sophisticated systems, technological fixes were argued to both 
underestimate and inadequately solve complex problems. Philosopher Alan Drengson, for example, explored the 
moral values and religious underpinnings of these wider critical perspectives [35]. He argued that technological 
fixes were too often short-term and incomplete, and consequently could camouflage the ultimate sources of larger 
problems and the nature of genuinely satisfactory solutions.  
The role of engineers in democratic society 
The faint voices of the beneficiaries – and potentially victims – of technological fixes are of some concern. For 
Howard Scott’s technocrats, engineers were expected to replace inexpert policy-makers, politicians, and economists 
by a “technate”, or technological government. For Weinberg, government-assigned teams of engineers would 
assume responsibility for addressing social problems for the national good. For Meier, the process of directing 
technical solutions was envisaged as cooperation between engineers and communities, but ultimately guided by 
those with expert knowledge.  
Such management by elites might be assessed and even voted upon by wider audiences, but this consultative process 
to some extent undermines the special role of technological competence in such a rational society. The effects of 
public participation in engineering solutions raised mixed feelings for Alvin Weinberg, who observed that some of 
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his technological solutions were unlikely to succeed in a liberal democracy, and that “nuclear energy seems to do 
best where the underlying political structure is elitist” [36]. 
The same issues may disempower communities or individual consumers who opt for technological fixes. They may 
fail to identify how the “problem” and “solution” have been framed by the designers, companies, governments or 
media sources who promote them. As a result, the “solutions” they are offered may be shallow or off-target, and 
reproduce undiscerning cultural values.  
Engineers consequently have important responsibilities regarding technological fixes. Designers need to pay close 
attention to the scope of their analysis and longevity of their solutions. They must consider not just the intended 
beneficiaries (e.g. customers, clients, funders) but also non-beneficiaries and “externalities” (e.g. marginal social 
groups, future generations, other species, and distant environments). Most importantly, they should recognize that 
complex modern societies incorporate multiple values and forms of expertise. Modern problems cannot be reduced 
to mere engineering solutions over the long term; human goals are diverse and constantly changing. 
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